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Assuming that higher traveling expenses reduce traveling time, this paper considers
reliefs for traveling expenses to work when a distorting wage tax is levied. While the
decision on traveling expenses would not be distorted if traveling costs were completely
deductible, taxation would still not be neutral with respect to the leisure-consumption
choice. Moreover, the paper shows that second-best optimum taxation requires less than
complete deductibility of traveling expenses to work.
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A Note on Reliefs for Traveling Expenses to Work
I.  Introduction
Tax rules concerning traveling expenses to work are quite different in the various indus-
trialized countries. While traveling expenses to work are not deductible in many coun-
tries like the United States, the United Kingdom and even several continental European
countries, tax allowances are granted by other countries like the Scandinavian countries
and Germany [see OECD (1993), p. 37].
The main argument in favor of a relief is that workers should not be distorted by
the income tax when choosing their place of work. Critics, however, argue that rather
than the place of work the location of residence matters and that preferential treatment of
far-off domiciles by the tax code not only reduces tax revenue but it is also inefficient.
However, this paper will not analyze tax allowances for traveling expenses to
work against the background of the discussion of whether the choice of the place of
work or the choice of the location of residence is causal for commuting [see, e.g.,
Krause-Junk (1996), Olbertz (1986), Richter and Theile (1998)]. Furthermore, equity
considerations, which are discussed concerning work-related expenses by, e.g., Baldry
(1998), will also be ignored. The focus will be on a particular efficiency aspect of travel-
ing expenses.
Reliefs also affect traveling expenses if both the place of work and the domicile
are given. Normally, higher traveling expenses result in less traveling time. By buying a
more expensive and thus faster car and by traveling by car instead of traveling by train
(or bicycle), the commuting time can be reduced. Hence, the deductibility of traveling
expenses to work guarantee that the decision upon them and therefore the decision on
the commuting time is not distorted by the income tax.
Since, at first sight, the neutrality regarding the traveling time says something for
the complete deductibility of traveling expenses, it is the purpose of this paper to analyze
in detail the tax treatment of traveling expenses to work assuming that less traveling time
requires higher traveling costs.- 2 -
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section two presents a
model and derives the first-best efficiency conditions. Section three characterizes the
market equilibrium and section four develops a second-best tax rule. Finally, section five
concludes.
II.  Traveling expenses and efficiency
The model considers a one-person economy where the individual derives utility from
private consumption C and leisure F. Preferences are represented by a well-behaved
utility function  ( ) U C F , .  F indicates the total time endowment and L the working time
in the production of goods. Furthermore, it is assumed that the individual has to spend
some time T to travel from home to the location where production takes place. Labor,
leisure and traveling time add up to the total time endowment.
Two goods are produced in the economy. One good can be either used as private
consumption good C or without additional costs as public good G. The other good X
covers the traveling expenses to work, which are not exogeneously given. At least to
some extent, they are used for reducing traveling time. Hence, the more X is used by the
worker, the less traveling time is needed:  ( ) T T X = , where  ¢ < T 0 and  ¢¢ > T 0.
In order to simplify the analysis, a linear one-factor technology with fixed techni-
cal coefficients is assumed. Measured in units of time, the unit costs of the first and the
second good are given by 1 aC  and 1 aX , respectively. While  LC denotes labor in the
production of C (and G), LX  denotes labor in the production of X.
If some quantity G of the public good is required, the first-best optimum is the
solution of
(1) ( ) Max U C F
C F L X L L C X , , , , , ,
s.t. C G a L C c + = ,
X a L X X = ,
( ) F F L T X = + + ,
L L L C X = + ,- 3 -
where the first two constraints describe the production technology, the third condition is
the time constraint, and the fourth condition covers the division of labor.








The marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption is equal to the mar-
ginal rate of transformation between leisure and consumption, i.e., the marginal produc-
tivity of labor in the consumption good sector.
On the other hand, efficiency requires
(3) ( ) - ¢ = a T X X 1.
The amount of saved traveling time produced by one additional unit of working time in
the production of X should be equal to its opportunity costs.
III.  Traveling expenses and labor income taxation
Suppose that lump-sum taxes are unavailable and that the public good is financed by a
linear labor income tax. Suppose further that traveling expenses to work are at least
partially deductible. Denote the producer prices of goods and labor by  pC,  pX , and w,
respectively. The wage tax rate is indicated by t. If a fraction d of the traveling expenses
is deductible from the tax base of the personal income tax such that the government
effectively subsidizes traveling expenses at a rate
(4) q td = ,
the government budget constraint can be written as
(5) t q wL p X p G X c - = .
The household sells labor and buys both types of goods at prices net of taxes and
tax reliefs.
1 Therefore, the utility maximizing household solves
                                               
1  Because of the technology, profit income is absent.- 4 -
(6) ( ) Max U C F
C L X , , ,





- - - 1 1 t q
,
( ) F F L T X = - - .
Rearranging the first-order conditions yields





















The marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption is equal to the real
wage net of the wage tax. The marginal productivity of time sparing traveling expenses is
equal to the relative price of X net of taxes and reliefs.
If markets are competitive, an equilibrium where profits
(8) ( ) PC C C C p a w L = -    and    ( ) PX X X X p a w L = -
are zero is characterized by
(9) p a w C C =    and   p a w X X = .
In the remaining part of the paper, the price of the consumption good C will be
normalized to some fixed positive value  pC. If the price of C is given, the equilibrium
price of X and the wage rate w are determined by the technical coefficients. Hence, all
producer prices are constant.
Combining the first-order conditions of the utility-maximization problem and the
















In general, both efficiency conditions (2) and (3) are violated. However, if traveling
expenses were completely deductible, i.e., if
(11) q t =    or equivalently   d =1,- 5 -
one of them would be fulfilled. Deciding upon traveling expenses, the household would
take the real opportunity costs into account. Nevertheless, the leisure-consumption
decision would be still distorted.
Since the main theorem of second best theory suggests that counting efficiency
conditions is, in general, misleading, the advantage of complete deductibility of traveling
expenses is questionable. In order to discuss the merits and demerits of complete de-
ductibility, a standard second-best-optimum-taxation approach has to be undertaken.
IV.  Traveling expenses and second-best-optimum taxation
Utility maximization of the household generates the labor supply function
( ) ( ) ( ) L w px 1 1 - - t q , , the demand function  ( ) ( ) ( ) X w px 1 1 - - t q , , and the indirect utility
function  ( ) ( ) ( ) V w px 1 1 - - t q , . Since all producer prices are constant, pC is suppressed.
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The optimization problem of the government is
(13) ( ) ( ) ( ) Max V w px t q t q
, , 1 1 - -
s.t. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) p G wL w p p X w p c X X X - - - + - - = t t q q t q 1 1 1 1 0 , , .
The solution can be described by
(14) ( ) ( )
















































where m is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government budget constraint and
l is the marginal utility of income. Using the properties of the household utility maxi-
mum and rearranging yields
(15) ( )
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p X C X
.- 6 -
This formula can be used to derive the following two main results of the paper. The
elasticities of labor supply are




































Proposition  1: Traveling expenses to work shouldn’t be deductible at all, i.e.,





















Hence, non-deductibility of traveling expenses to work is optimal only under very
special circumstances.
Calculating the partial derivatives of the labor supply function and using  ULL
2,
which is the second partial derivative of the utility function with respect to labor after
inserting the constraints, i.e., of  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) U wL p X p F L T X X C 1 1 - - - - - t q , , one is












Since the second-order conditions require  ULL < 0, this formula proofs the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 2: Traveling expenses to work should never be deducted completely from
the tax base of the labor income tax, i.e., q t =  or equivalently d =1 are never optimal.
The economic explanation for that result is straightforward. If traveling costs
were completely deductible form the tax base, the choice of traveling expenses would be
efficient, but due to the high wage tax rate, the leisure-consumption choice would be
                                               
2  ( ) ( ) ( ) U p U p wU w U p LL C FF C CF CC C = - - + -
2 2 2 2 2 1 1 t t- 7 -
heavily distorted. Introducing a small distortion of traveling expenses results in welfare
losses which are much smaller than the welfare gains from reducing the large distortion
in the leisure-consumption decision.
V.  Concluding remarks
This paper considered reliefs for traveling expenses to work in the presence of a distort-
ing wage tax. The focus of the analysis was neither on the choice of the locations of
work and home nor on the distance between them. Taking the view that higher traveling
expenses reduce traveling time, the aim was whether deductibility increases traveling
expenses to an inefficient amount.
It turns out that the relationship between traveling time and working time is of
particular importance in answering this question. While the decision on traveling ex-
penses and, therefore, the decision on traveling time would not be distorted if traveling
costs were completely deductible, taxation would still not be neutral with respect to the
leisure-consumption choice.
Using a standard second-best optimum taxation approach, it has been shown that
non-deductibility of traveling expenses to work is optimal only under very special condi-
tions and, even more importantly, that second-best optimum taxation requires less than
complete deductibility of traveling expenses to work.
The analysis is of consequence to the treatment of traveling expenses to work by
the income tax law, for instance in Germany. In Germany, the necessary cost of trans-
portation between the home and the place of work are deductible. However, since 1955,
only a specific amount per km (the so called „Kilometerpauschale“) times the distance
between the home and the place of work is deductible from the income tax base if a car is
used. The deductible amount per km, which was 0,50 DM in 1955, was reduced to 0,36
in 1967 and has been increased since 1989 up to 0,70 DM in 1994.
Since the result of this paper was that traveling expenses to work should be only
partially deductible form the tax base, the deductible amount per km should be less than
the complete cost per km. The analysis supports, therefore, the existing treatment of
traveling expenses to work by the German income tax law. However, if the opportunities- 8 -
of tax evasion are taken into account the paper backs the proposal of the income-tax-
reform commission led by P. Bareis which proposed in 1994 a fixed deductible amount
per km (0,20 DM) irrespective of the means of transportation (the so called „Entfernung-
spauschale“) [see Einkommensteuer-Kommission (1994)] .- 9 -
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